Mirko Dražen Grmek, Medejin kotao

Prikaz knjige Mirko Dražen Grmek, Medejin kotao: Pokusi na živim bićima u antici, s francuskog prevela Ana Buljan, ArTresor naklada, Zagreb 2004, 195 str

Empiricism in Hellenistic Medicine – Generalizations without Aetiologies

Empiristi su tvrdili da se medicinsko znanje u cjelini može steći na temelju iskustva i da za njegovo formiranje i primjenu nije potrebna nikakva teorija. Ključni dio toga stava sastoji se u odbacivanju istraživanja uzroka bolesti. Medicinsko se znanje sastoji od teorema koji su generalizacije izvedene na temelju iskustva. Ranije analize generalizacija kojima se služi medicina, kao i rasprave o stručnom znanju općenito, pokazuju da je među grčkim liječnicima i filozofima bio prihvaćen stav da ispravne generalizacije koje nekoj djelatnosti jamče status umijeća jesu eksplanatorne generalizacije – takve koje uključuju poznavanje uzroka. U članku istražujem na temelju čega empiristi mogu za neeksplanatorne generalizacije zahtijevati isti status i nastojim pokazati da je njihov argument u osnovi taj da statistički kriterij formulacije takvih generalizacija jamči njihovo podudaranje s događajima koje opisuju, što eksplanatorne generalizacije ne mogu osigurati.The Empiricists argued that medical knowledge is a matter of experience, and that no theory is required either for its formation or application. The central part of their position was rejecting the possibility of the discovery of causal connections by the use of reason. The theorems that make up medical knowledge are empirical generalizations that do not include the specification of the cause. However, the Greek authors outside Empiricism, both medical and philosophical, made a strong case for the claim that a generalization must be explanatory to be scientific or artistic. In this paper I discuss how non-explanatory generalizations, being statements of frequency of joint occurrences which are statistically accurate, can be taken by the Empiricists as scientific

Human Good in the Nicomachean Ethics I

Teorija o ljudskoj sreći u Nikomahovoj etici iznesena je u dvama odvojenim objašnjenjima, u I. i u X. knjizi. U X. knjizi Aristotel razlikuje dvije vrste sreće, dok iz rasprave u I. knjizi proizlazi da treba prihvatiti samo jednu odredbu sreće. Ipak, čini se kako u X. knjizi Aristotel poistovjećuje sreću s jednom aktivnošću, dok u I. knjizi pretpostavlja da ona uključuje više različitih aktivnosti. U članku se pokušava utvrditi kakvu koncepciju sreće nudi rasprava u I. knjizi, analizom argumenata kojima Aristotel dolazi do odredbe ljudskog dobra. Pokazuje se da argument iz ergona, koji dovodi do takve odredbe, nije zamišljen kao samostalan argument, nego ovisi o prethodnim argumentima kojima se utvrđuju formalni uvjeti za odredbu ljudskog dobra. Argument iz ergona može dovesti do odredbe ljudskog dobra utoliko što ljudsko dobro može svesti na jedan tip dobra, no njegov zaključak u sebi uključuje i uvjet potpunosti koji ovisi o prethodnom argumentu. Taj zaključak ne može specificirati vrstu aktivnosti u kojoj se sreća sastoji, no on formalno određuje uvjete za koje će se u konačnoj analizi pokazati da ih samo jedna aktivnost može zadovoljiti.In the Nicomachean Ethics, the theory of human happiness is set forth in two separate accounts, in Book I and in Book X. In Book X, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of happiness, while the discussion in Book I strongly suggests that only one definition of happiness should be accepted. Yet, it appears that in Book X Aristotle identifies happiness with one activity, while in Book I it is assumed that it includes more than one activity. I try to show what is the conception of happiness offered in Book I, by analysing the arguments by which Aristotle advances to the definition of human good. I argue that the ergon argument, which leads to this definition, is not intended in the Nicomachean Ethics to stand as independent argument, for its conclusion is wider and dependent on the previous arguments by which the formal criteria for human good are established. The ergon argument can lead to the definition of human good in as much as it can reduce human good to one type of good, but its conclusion includes the completeness criterion introduced from previous argument. This conclusion cannot specify the kind of activity in which happiness consists, but formally it determines the conditions for which the final analysis will show that only one activity can satisfy them

Syncretism and Encyclopaedism in Skalić\u27s Epistemon: a Case of Medicine

U članku se analizira dio teksta spisa Epistemon u kojemu Skalić prikazuje medicinu. Ta se rasprava o medicini analizira s nekoliko aspekata. Pokušava se izložiti struktura Skalićeva prikaza medicine, utvrditi koji su njegovi neposredni i posredni izvori, dati objašnjenje za neke nejasnoće u pogledu načina izlaganja te istražiti izvore nekih osobitosti Skalićeva pristupa medicini, poput helenizma. Također, u članku se, usporedbom rasprave o medicini s raspravom o duši koja joj neposredno prethodi, želi uputiti na metodološke teškoće Skalićeva pristupa u cjelini. Te dvije rasprave čine dvije metodološki posve različito organizirane cjeline – one su primjeri za dva glavna Skalićeva pristupa u izlaganju, enciklopedizam i sinkretizam. Dvije tematski bliske i povezane cjeline ovdje su metodološki oštro razdvojene na način koji upućuje na probleme u Skalićevu metodološkom pristupu djelu kao cjelini.The paper offers an analysis of the part of Skalić’s Epistemon which brings a discussion of medicine. Several aspects of the discussion are analysed. Attempt is made to show the structure of Skalić’s account of medicine, to identify his immediate and secondary sources, to explain some inconsistencies in the course of his presentation, and to determine the origin of some traits of Skalić’s approach to medicine, e.g., his apparent hellenism. Further, analysis of the account of medicine together with the preceding discussion of soul points to some methodological difficulties of Skalić’s general approach. The discussions of soul and of medicine make two methodologically different accounts, illustrating two different modes of approach to the presentation of the subject-matter, syncretism and encyclopaedism. Thus, two accounts, that are in many points closely related, are methodologically pronouncedly separated in a way that points to the difficulties with Skalić’s general methodological approach

Syncretism and Encyclopaedism in Skalić\u27s Epistemon: a Case of Medicine

U članku se analizira dio teksta spisa Epistemon u kojemu Skalić prikazuje medicinu. Ta se rasprava o medicini analizira s nekoliko aspekata. Pokušava se izložiti struktura Skalićeva prikaza medicine, utvrditi koji su njegovi neposredni i posredni izvori, dati objašnjenje za neke nejasnoće u pogledu načina izlaganja te istražiti izvore nekih osobitosti Skalićeva pristupa medicini, poput helenizma. Također, u članku se, usporedbom rasprave o medicini s raspravom o duši koja joj neposredno prethodi, želi uputiti na metodološke teškoće Skalićeva pristupa u cjelini. Te dvije rasprave čine dvije metodološki posve različito organizirane cjeline – one su primjeri za dva glavna Skalićeva pristupa u izlaganju, enciklopedizam i sinkretizam. Dvije tematski bliske i povezane cjeline ovdje su metodološki oštro razdvojene na način koji upućuje na probleme u Skalićevu metodološkom pristupu djelu kao cjelini.The paper offers an analysis of the part of Skalić’s Epistemon which brings a discussion of medicine. Several aspects of the discussion are analysed. Attempt is made to show the structure of Skalić’s account of medicine, to identify his immediate and secondary sources, to explain some inconsistencies in the course of his presentation, and to determine the origin of some traits of Skalić’s approach to medicine, e.g., his apparent hellenism. Further, analysis of the account of medicine together with the preceding discussion of soul points to some methodological difficulties of Skalić’s general approach. The discussions of soul and of medicine make two methodologically different accounts, illustrating two different modes of approach to the presentation of the subject-matter, syncretism and encyclopaedism. Thus, two accounts, that are in many points closely related, are methodologically pronouncedly separated in a way that points to the difficulties with Skalić’s general methodological approach

Präzision und Relativität in Aristoteles’ Auffassung der Tugend als der vernünftigen Mitte

The paper discusses Aristotle’s account of virtue as the mean, according to which our responses should aim at what is intermediate in respect of feelings and actions, by focusing on the problem of hitting the mean in virtuous responses. The problems with achieving precision in hitting the mean are due to the fact that one has to hit the intermediate by responding appropriately to a wide range of circumstances, which are mutable, situationdependent and discernment of which rests on perception. It is argued that the precision involved in finding the mean is best understood from the analogy with medical or dietetic practice. Hence, Aristotle’s use of medical examples is closely analyzed in order to clarify some difficulties and to answer at least some of the questions raised by Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean.U članku se raspravlja o Aristotelovom poimanju vrline kao prave mjere, prema kojemu bi naše reakcije trebale težiti onome srednjemu u osjećajima i djelovanjima, fokusirajući se na problem pogađanja sredine prilikom reakcija na temelju vrlina. Problemi postizanja preciznosti u pogađanju te sredine javljaju se zbog činjenice da pojedinac mora pogoditi sredinu prikladno reagirajući na širok spektar okolnosti koje su promjenjive, ovisne o situaciji i razlikovanje kojih ovisi o percepciji. Smatra se da se preciznost vezana za pronalazak prave mjere ponajbolje razumijeva preko analogije s medicinskom ili dijetetskom praksom. Stoga se Aristotelovo korištenje medicinskih primjera pozorno analizira s ciljem razjašnjenja nekih problema i odgovaranja na barem neke od pitanja koje otvara Aristotelovo učenje o pravoj mjeri.L’article discute de la notion aristitélicienne de vertu en tant juste mesure, d’après laquelle nos réactions devraient tendre vers l’intermédiaire dans les sentiments et les actions, en se focalisant sur la difficulté à atteindre le milieu au moment des réactions vertueuses. La difficulté à atteindre cette précision en visant le milieu est due au fait que l’individu doit le faire en réagissant de manière adéquate à tout un spectre de circostances changeantes, dépendantes de la situation et dont le discernement dépend de la perception. On considère que la précision liée à la découverte de la juste mesure se comprend le mieux à travers l’analogie avec la pratique médicale et diététique. C’est pourquoi on analyse attentivement l’emploi par Aristote d’exemples médicaux, dans le but de clarifier certains problèmes et de répondre à quelques-unes au moins des questions ouvertes par la doctrine d’Aristote.Das Referat diskutiert Aristoteles’ Herangehen an die Tugend als den Mittelweg, wonach unsere Reaktionen hinsichtlich der Gefühle und Taten nach dem Mittleren trachten sollten, indem sie bei tugendhaften Reaktionen auf das Erzielen der Mitte fokussiert bleiben. Die Schwierigkeiten mit der Erreichung der Präzision beim Treffen dieser Mitte liegen in der Tatsache, dass der Einzelne den Mittelweg einzuschlagen hat, indem er angemessen auf ein ausgedehntes Spektrum von Umständen reagiert, die wandelbar und situationsbedingt sind, und deren Wahrnehmung auf der Perzeption ruht. Man vertritt die Ansicht, dass die Präzision, involviert bei der Findung der Mitte, bestens in Analogie zu der Medizin- bzw. Diätpraxis zu begreifen sei. Daher wird Aristoteles’ Nutzung der medizinischen Beispiele eingehend analysiert, mit dem Ziel, einige Probleme zu klären, sowie zumindest etliche Fragen zu beantworten, die Aristoteles’ Doktrin von der gesunden Mittelmäßigkeit anbringt